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Summary 
Environmental problems, particularly in recent decades, have 
attracted attention worldwide, revealing an impending age of 
scarcity. The "environmental crisis" underscores the fact that we 
are running out of resources and out of places to store or 
dispose of our wastes. It reveals also that, above all, we are 
living in an age of scarcity of adequate institutions to face 
the realities of the ecological transition—from simpler, quasi-
natural systems to more complex patterns of interactions between 
humans and nature. The emergence of this new, ecological 
dimension in our social lives poses hitherto unforseen challenges 
to the social sciences, and to the everyday concerns of citizens 
and governments as well. History is replete with examples of 
civilizations that were shattered by the ecopolitical inability 
to sustain complex levels of social organization, and there is no 
reason to believe that we are more exceptional than past 
illustrations of ecopolitical folly. 
On the other hand, how a collectivity deals with nature 
discloses as much about its internal social relations as the 
other way around. Hence, the present inquiry is a prologue to 
more detailed study of ecopolitics, to the study of the 
political philosophy of relations between human beings and 
nature, exploring the feasibility of integrating the knowledge of 
the social and of the natural sciences on the interchange between 
human activities and the cycles of nature. This exercise is also 
an introduction to the study of specific type of public policies, 
those that address issues concerning resource use and 
conservation, and the quality of life, especially in the so-
called developing countries. 
Analysis of the Brazilian case provides a particularly 
helpful focus for Third World studies. Because Brazil is one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world, the study of its 
ecopolitics sheds light on the crucial dimensions of the debate 
over development and the environment, with important implications 
for politicians, policymakers and social scientists. 
The historical analysis of environmental management in the 
context of Brazil's political development unveils the social and 
political conditions that allowed for, and conditioned, the 
creation of a specialized environmental agency, the Special 
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bureaucratic politics of public policies concerning the 
environment reveals also how "environment" is conceptualized in 
development planning, and how environmental management reflects 
the main features of the political system and of the social 
formation of Brazil. 
Why not? We have a lot left to 
pollute. They don't. ,^ 14^ 
J. P. dos Reis Velloso, Planning 
Minister (1969-1974), on 
Japanese investments in Brazil. 
When the Gods whish to punish us, 
they answer our prayers. 
Oscar Wilde 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECOLOGY, A NECESSARY PARTNERSHIP 1/ 
The present research, like many others before it, assumes that 
the pursuit of knowledge through tightly bounded disciplines, 
such as anthropology, biology, ecology, economics, political 
science, and sociology, can be dangerously hampered if we do not 
boldly and courageously strive to integrate our knowledge 
fragments. Science cannot, of course, aspire higher levels of 
explanation without more sophisticated specialization. At this 
point, however, in the evolution of humankind, our most menacing 
prospect comes from too much of the same medicine. 
Unless we devise new ways to integrate the wisdom of the 
natural and social sciences, we may end up spending considerable 
effort to add less knowledge about more obscure or irrelevant 
phenomena. Never before have we been so close not to disaster, in 
the way zealot environmentalists believe, but rather to 
experiencing, on a planetary basis, the limitations of our 
fragile life-support systems. Activists and intellectuals alike 
tell us that nothing sort of a planetary ethics must arise if we 
are to survive as species. Likewise, the main thesis of this 
paper is that anything short of ecopolitical knowledge is bound 
to render the work of social scientists and policymakers 
substantially meaningless in their attempts both to understand 
society and to formulate better policies for improving the 
quality of life of its members. 
1. It is time for "ecopolitics" 
The history of humankind is the history of its relations with 
nature. More than pure rhetoric, this statement acknowledges a 
reality whose multiple facets have not been fully understood so 
far. Living in an era of automobiles, nonreturnables, and 
computers, we have been led to believe that we can get everything 
we want in the supermarket, in the corner drugstore, or through 
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computers, we have been led to believe that we can get everything 
we want in the supermarket, in the corner drugstore, or through 
telephone orders. Yet we forget that all our basic needs have a 
source on the land or in the sea. It has been all too easy to 
forget, for instance, that if it were not for the sudden 
disappearence of dinosaurs, human beings, like any other mammals, 
would not have had much chance to mature as a species. It is only 
when great famines occur, or when countries wage war in part to 
secure access to natural resources, that we stop suffering such 
lapses, that we experience that "We have for a long time been 
breaking the little laws, and the big laws are beginning to catch 
up with us."2/ But then, again, there is the conquest of the 
Moon, the advent of robotics, or a new breakthrough in the cure 
of cancer, and we retreat to our delusions of power. 
The emergence of this new, ecological dimension in the 
political debate poses hitherto unforeseen challenges to the 
social sciences. We need to identify and analyze what elements of 
the natural environment contribute to the flourishing, 
maintenance, and eventual demise of human societies; and how 
social conditions affect natural systems, disturbing or 
reinforcing their life-support cycles. Contrary to what many 
cultural anthropologists would like us to believe, constraints 
imposed upon human society strictly by environmental conditions 
neither exert a uniform influence nor always the same results in 
every society. These results depend on prevailing socio-political 
variables. Social stratification, cultural and religious values, 
the division of labor, and the distribution of power in one 
society may render it entirely vulnerable to certain adverse 
environmental conditions, while the same elements may represent 
the very strength of another society faced with similar 
environmental conditions. 
On the other hand, political and social life does not unfold 
according to human theories, much less does it wait for political 
knowledge to explain or orient its concrete manifestations. 
Because life is not lived on a theoretical plane but, rather, in 
the real world of social cleavages, corporate interests, and 
governmental actions, the ecological argument is almost by 
definition political.3/ Thus, to understand adequately the inner 
workings of an ecosocial system—how natural and human systems 
interact, reinforce, maintain, and transform one another—it is 
crucial to explore the political dimension of these relations. In 
effect, it is time to recognize that the ecological outcomes of 
the way people use the earth's resources are ultimately related 
to the modes of relationships amongst people themselves.4/ 
Ecopolitics is a short word for ecological politics. It 
emerges from the recognition that to overcome the current 
ecological and environmental crisis, decisions will have to be 
made, thereby favouring some interests over others, both within 
as well as between nations. The use, however, of "ecopolitics" to 
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label the study of the interplay between human activities and 
natural systems is of recent date. Karl Deutsch was probably 
among the first to classify in these terms this new field of the 
social sciences. According to his original definition, "it asks 
about the viability of ecological and social systems, singly and 
in their ecosocial interplay, and about the possibility, 
desirability and limits of political intervention. Its approach 
rejects the romantic illusion that all natural ecological systems 
are necessarily viable. Most of the earth's deserts are not man-
made. But it does insist that no social system can remain viable 
for long if it degrades or destroys its natural environment, or 
if it fails to save it from deterioration or self-destruction".5/ 
There has been a persistent disregard, both by social 
scientists and decisionmakers, of the rules that regulate the 
world surrounding us. These matters deserve our utmost attention 
in years to come, for, as Kenneth Boulding rightfully states, "No 
one is going to repeal the second law of thermodynamics, not even 
the Democrats."6/ To recognize the ecological roots of our 
current political problems is not only a matter of survival, but 
also a logical conclusion. Its urgency stems from the fact that 
time, the scarcest resource of all, is running out fast, or at 
least it is running faster thant the ability of our social and 
political institutions to face reality. If humankind is not able 
to learn from ecology, to rethink its attitude about the 
environment, as well as its place in nature, then, "some future 
articulating outcome of the evolutionary process may well be able 
to discourse on man as man himself has in the extinction of the 
dinosaur, owing to his inability to have adapted to its 
environment."7/ 
The point to be stressed here is that it is not a question 
of simply accommodating ourselves to the earth's carrying 
capacity, for humans have historically shown an outstanding 
ability to endure adverse environmental conditions. As Norman 
Myers indicates, it may be all right to improve established 
courses of action through "fine tuning," but there are times when 
one must do an "about turn" and take more drastic corrective 
action. His example of schoolchildren and their experimental frog 
is most appropriate to underline the ecopolitical challenges of 
today: "They took the frog and dropped it into a saucepan of 
boiling water, whereupon the frog skipped right out—instant 
rejection of an environment that proved distinctly unsuitable. 
But when the schoolchildren dropped the frog into a saucepan of 
Cold water, and slowly heated it up, the frog swam round and 
round, adapting itself to rising heat... until it quietly boiled 
to death". 8/ 
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2. Political thought and the ecological transition 
One way to perceive the challenges evinced by the current crisis 
is to explore also the uniqueness of our times, a uniqueness that 
could not have been foreseen by early political theorists. This 
refers to what John Bennett has characterized as the ecological 
transition, the development of an anthropocentric orientation 
toward the natural world that emerged in the Western Renaissance, 
one that has since characterized every civilization and nation.9/ 
Briefly stated, the transition involves, in technological 
terms, the tendency to seek ever-larger quantities of energy in 
order to satisfy the demands of human existence, comfort, and 
wealth. This is expressed, ecologically, in the growing 
incorporation of nature into culture, and by the breakdown of 
self-sufficiency, that is, not only the accumulation of goods and 
services for social purposes unrelated to biological survival but 
also the ability to achieve this through the incorporation of 
remote environments. Sociologically, it means the increasing 
complexity of social organization and the networks of 
communications associated with it. Philosophically, it entails 
the replacement of certain images of humanity by others, such as 
the worship and contemplation of nature versus the 
instrumentalization of nature. And politically, it means that to 
achieve a given level of output human beings will use political 
resources to adjust technology and social organization 
accordingly. 
It could be argued that given the above description, one 
could hardly expect a detailed treatment of ecological issues in 
traditional political and economic thought. Certainly, the 
present environmental crisis is a specific concern of the 
twentieth century, and not of the seventeenth (Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke), eighteenth (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo), or the nineteenth (John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels) centuries. But it is equally true that despite 
their profound differences, the common assumptions of major 
Western philosophers have actually forestalled a more fruitful 
understanding of the roots of our current situation. They all 
shared a certain disdain for everything that did not come from 
the hands or soul of humans. They all portrayed evolution as an 
almost unlimited road toward progress. And they all revealed an 
unlimited trust in technology. These assumptions were, of 
course, apparently justified by the discovery of the New World in 
the sixteenth century, and they were later enhanced by the 
Industrial Revolution. Yet, they all fall within the narrow 
illusion of unlimited frontiers to human development. 
It should be no surprise, by now, why many of today's 
political institutions, nurtured in a world of growth and 
abundance, are so ill-suited to the present challenges of the 
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"ecological transition," namely, the ever-increasing scarcity of 
resources and of places to dispose of our wastes. Technological 
innovations were once assumed to be the key to all problems 
derived from scarcity and pollution. Nowadays, however, 
technology can be shown to have ecological limits, for, as 
indicated by William Ophuls, "it is merely a means of 
manipulating what is already there, rather than a way of creating 
genuinely new resources."10/ The same applies to pollution 
because available techniques ultimately cannot do more than 
transport a harmful substance from one medium to another. 
Despite the flagrant weaknesses of theory, most of the 
debate about the crisis follows liberal or Marxist approaches, 
something that actually helps to confuse rather than clarify the 
issues involved in it. The inadequacy of liberalism can be more 
easily ascertained. The fact remains that socially uncontrolled 
private property, the primacy of individual over public 
interests, as well as the profit motive, do undoubtedly account 
for a good portion of the environmental and ecological disruption 
today. Andró Gorz is basically right when he says that the logic 
of capitalism, as we know it, is antithetical to the logic of 
ecolocfy.ll/ Nevertheless, it is quite deceitful also to pretend 
that Marxism has advocated a more "harmonious" relationship 
between humans and nature, when in fact Marxism opposes humans 
and nature. It becomes quite problematic to reconcile theory and 
reality, if one follows the conventional Marxist approach.12/ 
Indeed, it is hard to expect that in a socialist society, where 
the State is at the same time producer and regulator, polluters 
will punish themselves for their disruptive actions. 
In short, we cannot find in Marxism or in liberalism the 
basic tenets for a more rational approach to the relationship 
between human and natural systems. Moreover, the actual operation 
of both capitalist and socialist economies hardly qualifies them 
for membership in the Sierra Club or the Friends of the Earth, 
much less in the Green Party of West Germany. 13/ What is 
ecologically disruptive is not who controls production but the 
processes of production themselves, or rather the style of 
development—the prevailing patterns of production and 
consumption. Specific social relations may reinforce the 
disruptiveness of particular styles of development, as capitalism 
does, but they cannot be regarded as the direct causes of 
pollution. 
Notwithstanding this "weakness of theory" ,interpretations 
that try to avoid recognizing that the ecological outcomes of the 
way people use the earth's resources are ultimately related to 
the modes of relationships amongst people should be put to rest. 
To understand the implications of the ecological transition, one 
must attempt to grasp the social process behind it. The possible 
solutions to the environmental crisis must be found within the 
social system itself. Examples of the political implications of 
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environmental problems could be listed indefinitely,14/ but in 
doing so it would only stress even more the main thesis of this 
study: the environmental crisis is more pervasive and more 
political than any other crisis has been before; it can be felt 
by people anywhere on earth; and it transcends ideological and 
political boundaries. As the motto of the West German Green Party 
says, "We are neither left or right; we are in front." 
Irrespective of economic system or regime characteristics, 
we must all reckon with what Garrett Hardin called "the tragedy 
of the commons."15/ The essence of the "tragedy of the commons" 
derives from the negative effects of two mutually reinforcing 
elements of human societies in general. These refer to the 
maximization of one individual's goals in the pursuit of his or 
her self-interest; and to the collective ownership of a common 
pool of resources. Unrestrained freedom in utilization of the 
"commons" during an extended period of time is bound to produce 
harmful results to society at large. In Hardin's words: "Ruin is 
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons; freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."16/ 
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons also applies to 
the problems of pollution. In this case it is not a question of 
taking something out of the commons but of putting something in. 
The argument here is that one person's share of the cost to 
purify the environment is usually smaller than the cost of 
purifying the wastes before releasing them into a commons. This 
has led Hardin to conclude that "we are locked into a system of 
•fouling our own nest,' so long as we behave only as independent, 
rational, free-enterprises."17/ As a matter of fact, Hardin's 
interpretations bear a striking resemblance to the concept of 
externalities in economics. The notion also contains much of the 
so-called Prisoner's Dilemma, wherein altruism is sometimes 
penalized, and self-interest rewarded.18/ 
3. Studying ecopolitics in the Third World 
If it is hard to distinguish the ecological transition between 
the East and the West, a far stronger case can be made for 
contrasting the environmental crisis along North-South lines. 
Indeed, one may say that whereas in the advanced economies of the 
world, the environment has been generally equated with pollution, 
in the periphery most environmental problems refer to natural 
resource depletion. Actually, this distinction has become 
increasingly blurred in the Third World, and may be justified 
only for analytical purposes. The fact is that during the past 
decades not only has the economic gap widened between North and 
South but the environmental gap has also grown larger, and those 
in the South are on the worse end. 
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y >; developing countries not only have to concern thetosaives 
with1-environmental problems usually characteristic of "eaobeiafc* 
development but also have to find ways to preserve their resource 
base to overcome their "lack of (or distorted) development!'. i§/ 
Whereas air quality has improved markedly in cities like New York 
and Los Angeles, the atmosphere in Lima, Santiago, Mexico, Sao 
Paulo, or Calcutta is worsening considerably. Take, for example, 
also the exhaustion of the genetic resource base. According to 
available estimates, 15 to 20 percent of all species may become 
extinct by the year 2000, Where are they located? They are ¡mostly 
(40 percent) in the tropical forests of the Third World, which 
are being squandered with unprecedented carelessness.20/ It is 
hard to believe that pollution is only a Northern concern.? 
We are being constantly reminded that humanity is in t.he 
midst of a serious environmental crisis. What is meant by that 
term? Does environmental crisis stand for the contamination of 
the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink, or 
does it relate to other, structural elements of human evolution? 
What difference does it make, for politeal scientists and public 
administrators, to understand the essence of the ecological 
realities of today? Can we expect to add knowledge about social 
relations and political systems through an exploration of the 
interconnections between human activities and nature? Finally, 
can the case be made for the development of a new subfield in the 
social sciences, one that could realize the often repeated pleas 
for multidisciplinary studies integrating the knowledge of the 
natural and the social sciences? 
These are important theoretical pursuits, and they must 
shape ecopolitical analysis. However, results yelded by this sort 
of inquiry must be coupled with an examination of actual 
processes in a particular national setting. What are the 
ecological implications of Brazil's process of development in its 
remote and recent past? Who are the actors (individuals, groups 
and institutions) involved in managing environmental problems in 
Brazil? What is the nature of the interests that these actors 
represent in society? This line of inquiry should allow a better 
understanding of how and how well the Brazilian political system 
responds to the intensity and magnitude of the current process of 
resource depletion, pollution, and disruption of the habitat. 
Important, in this respect, is also an institutional 
analysis of the Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente (SEMA, 
Special Secretariat for the Environment), the Brazilian 
equivalent to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This 
should help uncover the reasons behind its cretion, the 
perception of SEMA1s administrators about its missions, programs, 
and procedures, as well as its ability to translate environmental 
concerns into articulate public policies and to promote their 
implementation. Equally important is to determine the ability of 
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those working at SEMA to incorporate environmental parameters 
into the planning process of other sectorial policies. Through 
the combination of macropolitical analysis with the study of the 
bureaucratic politics of governmental policies, we should be able 
to identify with considerable specificity the main actors, 
processes and structures involved in the ecopolitical arena in 
Brazil. 
On this basis, no claims can be made at providing an ex-
haustive treatment of ecopolitics in the Third World. By focusing 
on a single country, Brazil, and on a single governmental agency, 
SEMA, much is left out of the analysis. By adopting a determined 
level of analysis, combining macropolitical variables with the 
concrete study of politics within government, important 
analytical avenues remain also totally or partially unexplored, 
such as the study of public opinion, voting and political 
attitudes, or intergovernemntal relations. On the other hand, the 
universe of issues that deserves to be unfolded is so complex and 
diversified, and our knowledge of these issues is so meager, 
particularly in the Third World, that most probably it does not 
make much difference where we start as long as we get started. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
It has been sufficiently emphasized the fact that to understand 
adequately the inner workings of an ecosocial system It is 
crucial that we explore the political dimension of these 
relationships. However, this sort of understanding can come only 
after one acquires a historical perspective on how > economic 
interests, social classes, and the political and institutional 
structure have evolved in the recent past of a particular nation. 
Consequently, we turn our attention now to studying the process 
of social formation that makes more transparent the prevailing 
patterns of relationship between humans and nature in Brazil. . • 
Yet, meaningful knowledge cannot become relevant to the 
everyday concerns of citizens and policymakers without ĉareful 
scrutiny of the evidence immediately above the ground. 
Ecopolitics must, in this sense, come closer to ecopolicies. The 
study of the creation of a specialized agency for environmental 
matters in Brazil is thus a logical result of what will developed 
in the first three sections of this chapter. It is also a 
necessary prelude to a deeper analysis of environmental politics, 
for a closer focus on how decisions are made may shed light on 
more general processes. 
1. Some preliminaries about the Brazilian social formation 
Brazilian society is a typical example of "parallax view" at 
work. The parallax effect, a concept borrowed from astronomy, 
optics and other heavenly sciences to help unfold social reality 
in Brazil, indicates the apparent change in the position of an 
object resulting from the change in the position from which it is 
observed. This may indeed be the best way to describe Brazil. In 
a penetrating analysis of what he calls "the Brazilian dilemma", 
anthropologist Roberto da Matta has managed to reveal, with an 
insight unparalleled by any other study of the Brazilian 
character so far, that authority, hierarchy, violence, and 
oppression pertain to the society as much as democracy, 
egalitarianism, and compromise. He writes: "We have in Brazil 
carnivals and hierarchies, equality and compromise, with the 
cordiality of an encounter full of smiles giving place, shortly 
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after, to the terrible violence of the repulsive "do you know to 
whom you are talking?" And we also have samba [a Brazilian dance 
of African origin], cachaça [liquor distilled from fermented 
sugar cane], beach and soccer, but mingled with "relative 
democracy" and "Brazilian style capitalism", a system where only 
the workers assume the risks, while, as it is known, they do not 
realize any profit....And all of this, above anything else, in 
the name of our undeniable 'democratic vocation'".21/ 
Despite the apparent difficulty of characterizing the 
Brazilian social formation, its basic elements are quite 
straightforward: hierarchy,paternalism, repression, and 
authoritarianism, alone or combined in different ways. For 
example, being paternalistic, Brazil is also an extremely 
formalistic society, where rules and regulations are much more 
important than facts. Also, in a society at the same time 
paternalistic and repressive, there is always a "Big Father" to 
be reverenced, often the personification of the State through a 
demagogic leader, in contraposition to the depersonalized masses. 
Above and beyond these elements, however, the most dominant, 
structural facet of the political development of Brazil has been 
the presence of patrimonialism, a bureaucratic order that 
encompasses both public and private dimensions.22/ 
The patrimonial order is usually referred to by its concrete 
political practices of social control, such as clientelism, 
patronage, or cooptation, which combine elements of paternalism, 
repression, hierarchy, and the authority to rule and stand above 
social classes. The "estate" bureaucracy, administrative 
apparatus, and general staff of the patrimonial order should not 
be confused with the "State" bureaucracy, the "elite," or the 
"dominant classes." The bureaucracy does not constitute a class 
in and of itself, although more often than not it acts as a 
surrogate of the elite. It may stand above dominant classes, but 
it does not enjoy autonomy over society. Conversely, even if the 
composition of the elite changes, the patrimonial order persists. 
As Faoro explains, this bureaucratic "caste" develops a 
pendular movement that often misleads the observer. It turns 
against the landowner in favor of the middle classes; 
alternatively, it turns for or against the proletariat. Also, the 
bureaucratic apparatus may be modernizing or conservative. It may 
favor the pluralistic aspects of democracy or it may enhance 
patronage and cooptation. These apparent behaviors are actually 
optical illusions suggested by the projection of modern 
ideologies and realities upon a past that is historically 
consistent within the fluidity of its mechanisms. Therefore, for 
the estate patrimonial structure, social formations are mobile 
points of support. 
The process of formation of the Brazilian State also 
compounds the difficulties to understand reality in that country. 
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Whereas in the vast majority of today's countries the State 
follows the préexistence of a more or less organized society, In 
Brazil it happened the other way around. The first 
general-governor of Brazil, Tomé de Souza, arrived in the country 
in 1549 already with a government structure, laws, rules and 
regulations, and even with a constitution, the Regimento de 
Almeirim prepared in Portugal one year earlier. These had all 
been derived from the institutional and political system 
prevailing in Portugal, and they were to be implemented in a 
Brazil without Brazilians yet. The Indians, as still today, have 
never been considered citizens. The Brazilian State was, so to 
speak, part of Tomé de Souza's. luggage. This situation prevailed 
at least until the 1930s, when, despite some profound changes 
experienced by the society, the same institutional framework 
remained in force. 
This explains most of the elements of the social formation 
described above. The patrimonial, bureaucratic character of the 
State has imposed, and will probably continue to impose, its own 
limits on the constitution of society, giving it the distinctive 
features of formalism, bureaucratism, and authoritarianism. There 
has been such a concentration of power in the hands of the State 
that civil society has had very little room to, organize itself, 
to form strong channels for interest articulation. The little it 
may have had has often been co-opted or simply suppressed. On the 
other hand, political society itself (the Legislative, party 
system, and electoral processes) has not been able to represent 
the plurality of interests existing in Brazilian society. In 
short, to the formation of society and of the State in Brazil 
corresponds a power structure that is concentrated and 
exclusionary; an organization of decison-making processes that 
responds to the particular interests of the best organized groups 
of society; and, finally, a strong technocratic, hierarchical, 
and formalistic pattern of conflict resolution. 
Insofar as ecopolitics is concerned, the obstacles posed by 
this particular process of social formation seem to be rather 
obvious. First of all, we should take note of the legalistic 
tradition of Brazilian politics. The compulsion to have every 
minuscule aspect of life foreseen, regulated, enshrined in the 
law is such in Brazil that someone suggested the most effective 
solution to all of the country's problems would be one single law 
making all previous ones mandatory.23/ This means also that 
reality, to be accepted as such, must be first imagined by the 
legislator. For example, up to the presidencies of Getúlio Vargas 
(1930-45, 1951-54) the mobilization of the working classes was 
considered to be mostly a "police problem." Their unions became 
legitimized only when the State bestowed its recognition upon 
them. Similarly, in a patrimonial order where nothing has value 
in and of itself, environmental issues assume relevance in the 
eyes of the State as their functionality to its corporatist 
policies also increases. Until that happens, this particular 
12 
reality simply does not exist. Society, which is used to seeing 
through the eyes of the State, may not recognize it. Even after 
its sanctification through the law, there is not any guarantee 
that it will be adequately addressed, as Brazilian workers 
discovered long ago. 
A second aspect, in fact a corollary of the legalistic 
tradition, is the quasi worship of everything that is public. 
This manifests itself in several ways. The most common way was 
summarized by Raymundo Faoro as follows: "A Brazilian who excels 
is bound to have lent his collaboration to the State apparatus, 
not to private enterprise, to business success, or to cultural 
contributions, in a Confucian ethics of the good servant with an 
administrative career and a curriculum vitae approved from the 
top down. Victory in the social world, founded upon the 
intramundane asceticism of personal, rational, step by step 
effort, reveals in general contempt, a mediocrity that aim at 
glory in the style granted to it by Montesquieu". 24/ 
But because Brazilians are proud to be "the largest Catholic 
country in the world," while church attendance must be among the 
lowest, and while candomblé. umbanda. and other Afro-Brazilian 
rituals claim increasing numbers of followers, so their worship 
of the State is also blended with a certain dose of iconoclasm. 
All of this should not add more confusion. The State is the 
source of much of what concerns the individual, in private or 
public life, and the results are too well known to deserve 
further comments here: a tightly controlled society, corruption, 
and the distribution of privileges. Still, it should be 
underlined that corruption may assume a multitude of forms. It 
may represent direct payment in exchange for a favor, or it may 
be a specific way of making life easier without necessarily being 
illegal. It may not even be considered corruption. This should 
not alarm anyone, since, in many instances, the (in)famous 
jeitinho brasileiro [the Brazilian fix, sometimes euphemistically 
referred to as "creative imagination"] may well be a powerful 
weapon against the discretionary powers of the State. 
For ecopolitical purposes, the most important manifestation 
of corruption is the "structural" variety. Because to survive and 
to be kept in State favor one should not cause too many problems, 
it is no surprise that governmental agencies and State 
enterprises in Brazil are generally the worst environmental 
offenders. The State sector is the first to claim environmental 
awareness, but it is also the first one to shove problems under 
the rug. 
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2. Ecopolitics in Brazil, from colonial times UP until 1964 
Even without firm ecological periodization, three important 
periods stand out in the ecopolitical history of Brazil. The 
first encompasses the initial two hundred years of colonization, 
when the roots of agriculture were laid. The second is the time 
between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first 
decades of the twentieth, when the agricultural enterprise paved 
the way for industrialization. The final period, stretching from 
the 1950s to the late 1970s, witnessed the rapid modernization of 
the country. Actually, if speculation could run wild—of th© kind 
that Karl Popper once said "makes science possible"—one could 
indicate, with a good degree of confidence, that thé most 
important ecopolitical phase is yet to come, most probably in the 
next decade. Ecopolitical historians of the twenty-first century 
will probably classify the 1990s as "Brazil's time of reckoning." 
Ecopolitics of colonial Brazil can be described through one 
of the most salient environmental dimensions of the patrimonial 
order: extractivism (vegetal, mineral, and agricultural'). From 
the discovery of Brazil in 1500 until the turn of the eighteenth 
century, colonization was based on successive cycles of 
extraction that more or less coincided with the tendencies and 
fluctuations on the international scene, but that also varied 
with the ecological cycles in terms of exhaustion. At first, 
brazilwood and the red dye it produced was the only thing that 
mattered to Portugal. Brazilwood was followed by other extractive 
cycles, especially chestnut, cocoa, and rubber. Rubber had more 
significance than the other two, lasting until the first decades 
of the twentieth century. Sugar production also had cyclical 
fluctuations, alternating with cotton, tobacco, and coffee. 
Livestock activities emerged basically as a response to the needs 
of the agrarian economy for food and beasts of burden, but it 
also played a crucial role in the extractive cycle for minerals. 
Mining started with the discovery of gold in 1695, and of 
diamonds a little later, and lasted until the end of the 1700s. 
The most profound environmental feature of colonial times, 
one that has left the deepest and most distinctive impression on 
today's agricultural practices, was the way in which the land, 
then the most precious natural resource, was appropriated and 
utilized. The presence of large rural properties can be explained 
on the basis of land's abundance combined with the patrimonial 
order. In any event, this type of land concentration usually 
spells disaster. Socially, it locks peasants and rural workers 
into a cycle of poverty, with low wages, indebtedness, and 
servitude. Ecologically, it perpetuates the irrational use of 
the land, through shift cultivation, and through slmsh-and«-burn 
techniques that lead to the abandonment of the land after two or 
three years of cultivation. With land concentration came 
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monoculture, which violated all principles of ecological wisdom, 
contributing to soil deterioration and to desertification. 
Monoculturalism, in its broadest sense, meaning not only 
agriculture but also economic overspecialization (in mining, in 
extractive activities, and in manufacturing) is always 
predatory. It has always been detrimental to the country, 
economically, politically, and environmentally. Sure enough, as 
early as 1877 the Northeast suffered its first major drought, 
which lasted for two years. As late as 1986, the South enters 
this cycle. Since the very first moments of Brazil's existence, 
Brazilians have boasted about the immensity of their territory, 
and the quality of its soil, as attested by the jingoism of Pero 
Vaz de Caminha, the official registrar of the discovery. But the ' 
"big laws" of ecology started to catch up with them, and the 
ecopolitics of colonial Brazil took its toll. 
With independence and the advent of the Brazilian Empire in 
1822, the basic character of the economy did not change. Its 
secular orientation toward external markets helped to maintain 
and reinforce the binomial relationship between land 
concentration and monoculture. The political changes that ensued, 
however, deepened the ideology of "tear down and move on" that 
still squanders the country's resource base without much concern 
for the future. State power was consolidated in the hands of the 
proprietor classes, the sugar producers in the Northeast, and 
coffee planters in the Southeast. In addition to strengthening 
the power of the landed oligarchy, several important alterations 
of the ecopolitical landscape resulted from independence. 
Foremost among them, a truly Brazilian bureaucracy was born, 
to fill the many posts in the governmental structure that had 
been created to look after the interests of the Portuguese crown 
when the court was in Rio. The process of independence itself 
added to the growth and expansion of an already enlarged 
metropolitan bureaucracy that was clearly disproportionate to the 
country's economy and population. Paramount also was the creation 
of the National Guard in 1831, which soon was able to mobilize 
200,000 men, in contrast to the 5,000 man professional army of 
the first years of the empire. The coronel, power broker par 
excellence, represented the very personification of the 
patrimonial order and of regionalism as well. His title, still 
used to name political bosses in the rural areas, derives 
historically from the rank given to the head of the local 
regiment of the National Guard, who was the main intermediary 
between state and federal governments, on one side, and local » 
interests, on the other. 
Another major change of the nineteenth century was the 
abolition of slavery in 1888, a process that started with the 
traffic in slaves being brought to a halt in 1850. In 1871 
freedom was granted to children born to slaves and, in 1885, to 
slaves over sixty years of age. This was partially brought about 
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by international pressure, especially from Britain/ but it also 
had/ indigenous causation. The development of the economy in that 
period shows that, except for slave owners themselves, everyone 
else gained from abolition. The increasing costs of slave labor, 
especially after 1850, its inefficiency, the larger internal 
market needed by an incipient industrial bourgeoisie, all these 
elements combined to produce the downfall of slavery in Brazil. 
As a result of this process one finds European immigration and 
the beginnings of manufacture. Between 1884 and 1903, over 1.7 
million immigrants arrived in Brazil.25/ Most came to substitute 
for slave labor in the coffee plantations of São Paulo, but many 
established themselves in the capital, thereby contributing to 
the expansion of industrial activities. 
Most "environmental" concerns during the empire could be 
subsumed more readily under public health issues. It was one 
epidemic, for example, that led to the organization in 1857 of 
the first service for sewage drainage in Rio de Janeiro. When one 
examines the many regulations issued during that period, 
especially the Regimento dos Municipios (1828), which organized 
public life in the municipalities, it is also impressive to note 
the extent to which the State was authorized to interfere with 
private businesses. The minute detail on how public officials 
were to prevent the occurrence of "anything that may alter or 
deprave the salubrity of the atmosphere" would amaze, and of 
course enrage, most antiregulation crusaders of today. 
Finally, basically as a result of the efforts of André 
Rebouças, albeit not very successful, there appeared an incipient 
conservationist movement. Deeply impressed by the creation in 
1872 of the first modern national park in the world (Yellowstone 
in the United States), Rebouças four years later proposed the 
creation of two national parks in Brazil: one in Ilha do Bananal 
(in the Central Region), and another in Sete Quedas (in the 
South). For reasons that are not entirely clear, these pioneering 
proposals had to wait sixty years to be finally implemented. And 
for reasons that are well known to all*--the construction of the 
Itaipu Dam in the 1980s—took less than that time to undo 
Rebouças*s dream. Sete Quedas no longer exists. 
The empire was brought down by the convergence of two 
forces, inaugurating the Brazilian Republic in 1889. These were 
the disaffection of the dominant classes with respect to slavery 
and the growing influence of the military, particularly after the 
war against Paraguay. Hence, a new era began in Brazilian 
politics and economics. Its characteristics were the dominance of 
the national bourgeoisie, first agrarian and later industrial, 
but most of the time it was associated with export-oriented 
commercial interests, and the presence of the military in 
politics. At the other extreme, stood the majority of the 
population, mostly rural workers—some of slave origin, others 
having descended from Portuguese immigrants or from the 
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miscegenation process—and recent Italian, German, and Japanese 
immigrants. Also in the lower strata there was already an urban 
proletariat, mostly of Italian and Spanish origin. 
The heavy presence of foreign capital also shaped the 
formation of the ecopolitical arena in this period ending in 
1930: of the 201 corporations authorized to operate between 1899 
and 1919, 160 were foreign. 26/ Finally, the process of 
transformation that was taking place in the economy and society 
of Brazil entailed at least one major ecological change, the 
growth of cities. One of the consequences of urbanization was the 
proliferation at the turn of the century of tenements and 
multiple family dwellings, the forebears of the modern favelas 
(squatters' settlements), where one may find, today, between 
three-fifths to two-thirds of the population of a metropolitan 
region. Another consequence of urbanization was the deterioration 
of sanitary conditions in the cities. During the empire, as noted 
above, the great drought of 1877-79 signaled the beginning of the 
environmental crisis in the rural areas. Likewise, its earliest 
urban manifestation was the epidemic of yellow fever and bubonic 
plague in Rio de Janeiro in 1903. The political overtones of 
environmental problems or, according to the perspective adopted 
here, the ecological foundations of politics are clearly 
demonstrated in the bitter dispute that followed Oswaldo Cruz's 
attempts to solve the problem and establish a sanitary policy for 
Rio de Janeiro.27/ 
The three decades from the closing of the "Old Republic" 
(1889-1930) and the advent of the military regime (1964) 
represent one of the most interesting periods of Brazilian 
history. Politically, the installation of the Getulio Vargas' 
regime from 1930 up until 1945 represents the downfall of an 
oligarchy that comprised large landowners, coffee producers and 
export-oriented commercial interests, and its replacement by a 
new, populist alliance. Forgers of the populist pact were the 
rising industrial bourgeoisie, the agrarian elites whose 
productive activities were oriented toward the internal market, 
the corporatively organized urban workers, and the "new" middle 
classes emerging from the growth of the bureaucracy as well as 
from State induced industrialization. These middle classes 
distinguished themselves from the old, "parasitic" middle classes 
through their increasing relationship with the productive 
structure of the country. 
This period also witnessed the strengthening of the 
industrialists, who after 1964 became the dominant class. Also of 
importance we should note the early stages of a strong 
technocracy, based on the multiplication and expansion of both 
public and private organizations in the decades before 1964. 
Technocrats were the most articulate members of the "new" middle 
classes, encompassing lawyers, administrators, managers, health 
workers, educators, and other occupational groups. Together they 
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have formed what F. H. Cardoso calls the "bureaucratic rings" 
that link the interests of foreign and domestic capitalists; with 
those of these specialized, highly trained technicians.28/ These 
rings, which operate through the management levels of State 
enterprises, private corporations, and the governmental 
bureaucracy, played a leading role in the presidency of Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1955-61) and especially thereafter, creating new 
channels for interest articulation beyond political party 
structures, as well as new forms of clientelism. 
In economic terms, these three decades embodied dramatic 
alterations in the productive structure of the country.29/ During 
the years 1940-61, the gross national product increased 232 
percent, per capita product rose 86 percent, and industrial 
production climbed 683 percent. This was also a period in which 
major efforts were made toward integration of the national 
territory, especially through construction of highways. Between 
1928 and 55, railways increased only 10 percent, to 37,000 km 
(23,000 mi), whereas highways more than tripled, reaching a 
total of 460,000 km (290,000 mi). Especially after 1955, 
industrial expansion centered on the automotive industry, with 
the production of cars reaching 35,000 (a fifteenfold increase) 
in 1962, while trucks and buses totaled 30,000 (a rise of 150 
percent). The presence of the State in the economy, if not yet as 
spectacular as during the military regime, was already 
considerable. State participation in total expenditures rose from 
17.1 percent in 1947 to 23.9 percent in 1960. The public sector 
was responsible for 28.2 percent of the total investment, or the 
gross capital formation of the country, in 1956, a proportion 
that jumped to 48.3 percent in 1960 and to 60 percent in 1964. 
This last characteristic of the period, State 
interventionism, had a twofold impact on ecopolitics in Brazil. 
Natural resources became an important governmental priority, and 
there was a persistent move toward nationalization. Heavy 
exploitation also began, resulting in depletion of the resource 
base. Several public organizations, either agencies or 
enterprises, came to oversee or promote, under state monopolies, 
the exploration of natural resources. Similarly, important 
initiatives were taking place in legislation, such as the 
promulgation of several codes: Waters, Mining and Forestry Codes, 
all in 1934; the Fishing Code, in 1938; and the Hunting Code, in 
1943. Governmental structure also became an object of change. For 
example, in the early 1960s the municipal governments of Santo 
André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano do Sul, in the 
so-called ABC Paulista—the heart of the automotive industry in 
São Paulo—founded the Intermunicipal Commission for Water and 
Air Pollution Control (CCPAA). This became the embryo of today's 
State Company of Environmental Sanitation Technology (CETESB), 
which is considered to be the largest and best equipped 
environmental control agency in Latin America. In Rio de Janeiro, 
the Sanitary Engineering Institute (IES) was created in 1962, 
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later becoming the State Foundation of Environmental Engineering 
(FEEMA). 
Insofar as conservation is concerned, the First Brazilian 
Conference for the Protection of Nature, which took place in in 
1934 in Rio de Janeiro, marks a new era of awareness. Of the 
thirty-eight national parks and biological reserves that exist 
today, half were established between 1937 and 1961, comprising 
over one million hectares of protected land, flora and fauna. 
Roughly eleven of the sixty-nine state parks and biological 
reserves were also created before 1964, with close to 900,000 
hectares. This brings the total of officially protected area in 
this period to close to one-fourth of one percent of Brazil's 
total area, which is still one of the lowest indices of any 
nation in the world.30/ Finally, community organizations also 
emerged around environmental issues. Among the most active 
organizations in the 1930-64 period were the Associação Rio 
Grandense de Proteção aos Animais (ARPA, 1951, protection of 
fauna), the Associação de Defesa do Meio Ambiente (ADEMA, 1955, 
environmental protection and conservation), and the Fundação 
Brasileira para Conservação da Natureza (FBCN, 1958, 
environmental protection and conservation). 
3. Developmentalism and megalomania: Brazil under 
military rule 
The crisis of the political system in 1964 represents the 
culmination of a process through which successive attempts had 
been made to solve the crisis of oligarchic domination that went 
back to the collapse of the Old Republic in 1930. Neither 
populism (Vargas 1930-45) nor developmentalism (Kubitschek, 1956-
61), much less reformism (Goulart, 1961-64), seemed to have 
worked. Faced with the choice of deepening the incorporation of 
new social groups into the general process of economic growth, or 
accelerating the modernization of the most dynamic sectors of the 
economy, the Brazilian elite opted for the latter. That would, of 
course, hasten the associated and dependent character of the 
incorporation of Brazil into the international economic order. 
But the transformation of Brazil into a "world power," according 
to the ideology of the military regime, was well worth its social 
costs. The same applied to the political costs of marginalizing 
from public life the popular sectors of society, depriving an 
entire generation of its political citizenship. Environmentally, 
the costs would also prove to be great as well. 
The civilian-military regime installed in Brazil after 1964, 
can be expressed in very simple terms. It represented the 
alliance of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie with 
multinational interests. The agrarian and commercial elements of 
the bourgeoisie now occupied the back seats. The working classes 
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were, of course, excluded. What has made this alliance possible, 
or, more candidly, what enabled the rule of the dominant 
classes, was the existence of a well-trained, specialized, «Wi 
willing technocracy, both civilian and military. i 
The 1964-82 period may go into history as a time of stirring 
up the "dormant giant" mentioned in the national anthem. 
Brazilians manifest a tendency to favor grandiose schemes; they 
have the biggest football stadium in the world, the largest 
(urban) tunnel in the world, the largest (intercity) bridge in 
the world, and a series of "wonders" that are called the biggest 
even when they are not. Such grandiose self-perceptions do not, 
of course, automatically require the bureaucratic-authoritarian 
pact to be wasteful, but they characterize a culture where waste 
was almost inevitable. The differences between countries like 
Argentina and Chile, where the technobureaucracy allied itself 
with merchant capital, and Brazil, where the alliance was forged 
with industrial capital, are big enough to do without much 
explanation. In the first case, deindustrialization took place* 
as did absolute squandering of natural resources in the broadest 
sense—human, material, financial, and ecological. In the other 
case, industrialization and modernization ensued, even if with 
doses of prodigality that most Texans and Soviet bureaucrats 
would envy. Still, when the new alliance occurred under the 
Brazilian banner of "national security," then industrialization 
was bound to be sprinkled with monuments to human grandeur. 
These works cannot be dismissed as a mere "tendency to 
exaggerate or imagine things big," as is the definition of 
megalomania. They are instead quite real and, above all, 
ecologically and financially costly. The first manifestation of 
this emerging "world-power" complex was, undoubtedly, the 
Transamazon highway, which was supposed to run for 4,300 
kilometers (2,600 miles) and to consolidate the integration of 
the national territory. It drew worldwide attention as it 
accelerated the assault on one of the few tropical forests left 
on earth, and it lead to what became known as "the genocidal 
policies" against Indian populations.31/ Located at the eastern 
border of the forest, in the states of Pará and Maranhão, is- the 
largest mineral deposit in the world (here we go, again1) in an 
area of 780,000 km2 (300,000 mi2), or the equivalent of Texas and 
New England combined. There one finds the latest and most 
ambitious venture of the regime, the Carajás Project. Over $60 
billion is expected to be invested and, if all goes well, the 
project will generate around $18 billion in exports by the 1990s 
(especially of iron ore, bauxite, manganese, and nickel). To meet 
the energy needs of Carajás stands the environmentally 
controversial Tucurui hydro station, with a price tag of $16 
billion to generate 8,000 megawatts of electricity. 
Near the southern border with Paraguay Itaipu, the largest 
hydroelectric project in the world, was built, at a time when 
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Brazil was already approaching surplus production of electricity. 
When Itaipú is fully operational it will have cost $16 billion to 
produce 12,600 megawatts, or 20 percent more electricity than the 
the projected capacity of the U.S. Grand Coulee Dam, the largest 
in the world today. In the meantime, Itaipú has destroyed the 
Sete Quedas Falls, inundated farmland and natural sanctuaries, 
and evicted thousands of families. 
The energy orgy was completed through the Brazil/West 
Germany Nuclear Treaty of 1975, which called for the construction 
of eight power plants, at a cost of over $30 billion. A 
Westinghouse- built nuclear plant, contracted before the German 
deal, was to come on line in 1977, but it has managed only trial 
runs by 1983. Incidentally, this plant was built on one of the 
worst-proven ecological sites, whose indian name (Itaorna) means 
"rotten rock." In addition to that, the plant stands in the 
middle of a string of world-famous beaches between Rio and São 
Paulo, barely 90 miles and 150 miles from the two most populous 
concentrations of Brazilians. In short, it has already cost 
several times more than originally anticipated, due to a fact 
known for centuries to indians; it may hurt tourism; and it poses 
a serious threat to over 25 million persons, as it does to the 
flora and fauna of the region. On top of everything else, it was 
built also in the South, which adds to making Itaipú's 
contribution of energy even more surplus. As a matter of fact, 
the Angra dos Reis nuclear power plant has had so many problems, 
with short periods of work followed by longer shutdowns, that 
people call it "firefly," evidencing the Brazilians' sense of 
humor amidst a tragedy of planning that must be also one of the 
largest in the world. 
Also indicative of technocratic rationality at its most 
questionable is the Pro-Alcohol Program, designed to find a 
national substitute for imported oil. Many consider it to be a 
success, for its yearly production of over 10 billion liters 
(over 2.5 billion gallons) allows for a 20 percent mixture of 
alcohol with gasoline. Furthermore, over a third of the national 
car fleet runs exclusively on alcohol. On the other hand, 
Brazilian environmentalists cogently ask whether the alcohol 
program is worth the ecological costs. It is undoubtedly true 
that Pro-Alcohol represents a sounder strategy for energy 
problems in general, i.e., the development of renewable sources. 
However, only 6 to 8 percent of Brazilians own an automobile, 
and creating a renewable energy source for them comes at the cost 
of displacing essential food crops for all citizens through 
extensive plantations of sugar cane. Similarly, the 10 billion 
liters of alcohol produced each year represent 100 to 120 billion 
liters of vinhoto, a waste product. In these quantities this 
effluent has a toxicity equivalent to the sewage of 280 to 340 
million persons in terms of BOD, or biochemical oxygen demand, a 
commonly used measure of water pollution. In other words the 
yearly production of alcohol is equivalent to the pollution 
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generated annually by the untreated sewage of two to three times 
the «ntire population of Brazil. .*:^ 
The list of "accomplishments" of the military regime could 
grow longer, but the point, however, is not simply the 
grandiosity of Itaipu and other projects. There can be no doubt 
that it is much better to spend money in this fashion, on an 
infrastructure that will be put to use in the future, than to put 
it in Swiss bank accounts, as did the Argentine generals and 
Mexican power brokers.12/ Above all else, however, what must be 
noted in the case of Brazil is that all of this took place in 
less than ten years. There is simply no other example, in the 
history of capitalism, of one country's developing so many and 
such diversified projects all at once. But this also means that a 
massive debt developed in less than one generation will have to 
be paid back by several generations to come. 
Many of these projects make sense in purely economic terms. 
It is undoubtedly clever to spend cruzados every time a car stops 
at the "gas" pump than having to spend hard-earned dollars. But 
do these projects make genuine sense in a country that has the 
highest concentration of income among thirty-two major capitalist 
countries? Or do they make sense in a country that has the 
highest rates of infant mortality, malnutrition, and parasitic 
diseases among nations with a comparable level of per capita 
income?3 3/ Notwithstanding the severe "social" costs of 
megalomania, "costs" that are in fact an euphemism for misery and 
starvation, ecological and environmental costs must also be 
brought into the picture. There has been extensive destruction of 
nature, with irreparable loss of fauna and flora, and increasing 
levels of pollution. Even more important, the impacts of all 
these projects in the squandering of natural resources have yet 
to be accounted for. The process of desertification of the Amazon 
is but one manifestation of this type of accountability, and 
probably not the worst. The monoculturalism of Pro-Alcohol, the 
lake formed by Itaipú, the exploitation of mineral reserves at 
Carajás—all represent a direct toll on Brazil's natural resource 
base. The financial resources needed for their development must 
be paid back, which in turn creates a need to earn dollars, which 
means more exports, which means intensified exploration of 
already overexploited resources. 
As this process continues on and on, one may fully 
appreciate the extent of Brazil's social and environmental 
mortgage. It was a nationalistic Olavo Bilac who asserted; "Não 
verás Pais como este1" ["you will not see a country such as this 
one!"]. Every Brazilian child, is taught to appreciate Bilac's 
description of the country's riches, which has helped to fuel 
Brazilian jingoism for over a century. In years to come we may 
see the day when his exhortation is substituted by the title of a 
recent novel: Não verás Pais Nenhum1 [You will see no country at 
all!].34/ Finally, insofar as ecopolitics goes, it should be 
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pointed out that in none of the projects mentioned so far have 
Brazilian citizens as a whole been called upon to decide these 
issues. The ecopolitical side of Brazilian politics during the 
military regime is thus best portrayed in tragedy or in farce, in 
the anecdotes of powerless Brazilians about nuclear "fireflies," 
or electricity being dumped into already short-circuited 
Paraguay, or the Transnowhere Highway that connects "nowhere" to 
"no place," and only does this during the dry season. In the land 
of "the largest," above and beyond anecdotes, stands Cubatão, 
considered one of the most polluted cities on earth today. 
The social and political dilemmas of Brazil are 
environmentally compounded, in short, by what has been recently 
emphasized: too much, on too many fronts, in too little time. It 
may indeed be said that one of Brazil's major ecopolitical 
problems derives precisely from what may be called the 
"superimposition of history," i.e., the fact that Brazilian 
economic growth and social differentiation finds no parallel in 
the historical development of the now industrialized societies. 
This superimposition of history may be interpreted in a positive 
way, if we consider that in its process of rapid economic growth 
Brazil has never had to face environmental conditions as harsh as 
those of Great Britain during the nineteenth century. This 
applies even to the most depressed areas on the periphery of the 
urban centers. On the other hand, if Brazil has not had a 
"situational" Liverpool, it has had a "structural" Cubatão in the 
industrial heart of São Paulo. Conversely, Brazil has not yet 
solved basic sanitation and public health problems, and already 
the country displays extreme cases of environmental degradation. 
Consequently, when one looks at the 1960s and 1970s, the 
official ideology clarifies the relation between ecology and 
development in Brazil. After all, most of the institutional 
structure to deal with resource management and environmental 
protection was set in motion in this period. This was also the 
period in which the bulk of Brazilian environmental legislation 
was enacted. Nonetheless, even the most outspoken 
environmentalist must agree that Brazil's ennvironmental problems 
cannot be blamed on the lack of legal statutes. Developmentalist 
ideology has been so effectively ingrained in Brazilian politics 
that even those who were supposedly on the other side of the 
fence have fallen prey to it. Seldom if ever would environmental 
protection agencies adopt an adversary stand in public policy. 
The most complete expression of their naivete was their widely 
proclaimed slogan of "development with low ecological cost." This 
euphemism is so powerful that many bureaucrats who proclaim to be 
environmentally conscious do not even perceive the ideological 
overtones of the message.35/ 
Lest no one miss the point, it should be made crystal clear 
that there is no suggestion here that, in order to explore 
natural resources rationally or to protect the environment, one 
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must be antldevelopment either. We must recognize the 
conflictive—yet, not necessarily antagonistic—relationship 
between environment and development. To expect that 
entrepreneurs, in a dependent capitalist economy, will take 
environmental "costs" into account is as naive and Pollyannaish 
as to expect that they will protect the interests of labor. 
Again, labor unions are the last to assume a stand against 
development, for in fact they share the interests of businessmen 
in economic growth. But, if labor had advocated "development with 
low human cost"—or other stupidities like "labor*- impact 
assessment," for that matter—it would be now in a worse 
situation than it actually is. 
Several important ecopolitical implications derive from the 
military regime. Some of these will no doubt strongly influence 
the prospects for democracy in the near future, such as the 
emerging industrial-military complex 36/ and the polarization of 
social differences between classes and groups. The combination 
also of some of the elements of the "new" authoritarianism 
(demobilization of society, internationalization of the economy, 
and technocratism), all shaped ecopolicies in Brazil. Policies 
came to be formulated and implemented in an autocratic way. Itie 
disproportionate importance given to pollution control over* the 
management of natural resources constitutes just one of several 
examples. But the synergistic effect of these also poses serious 
questions for ecopolitics in the future. With the return to 
civilian rule and the expected reorganization of society, there 
is absolutely no guarantee that a new brand of corporatism will 
not emerge. If so, environmental problems could still be treated 
separately, on an emergency basis, and according to the narrowly 
defined interests of each social class or economic group. 
Garrett Hardin and William Ophuls, for example, appear to 
believe that the current rationality guiding the use of common 
resources could lead to authoritarian societal organizations, and 
that this might be the only way to enhance our chances for 
overcoming the environmental crisis and surviving the ecological 
transition. I believe, however, that the danger comes the other 
way around, and Brazil may unfortunately provide the best 
illustration in years to come. It is precisely the corporatist 
organization of this society, with the heavy burden of its 
patrimonial and authoritarian heritage, as well as its inherent 
inability to conciliate the interests of each sector into a 
genuine "national" program, that may truly underscore thé 
"tragedy" of the commons. 
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4. The creation of the Special Secretariat for the 
Environment 
It has become almost axiomatic to repeat Engels1s assertion that 
people themselves make their history, only they do so within a 
determined environment that conditions it, based upon real 
relations that are already in place.37/ Bearing Engels in mind, 
we turn to a little known, almost unnoticed fact of Brazilian 
ecopolitical history, that is, the very situation, almost 
fortuitous, that allowed SEMA to come into being. 
In the late 1960s Congress was suggesting the need for a 
national environmental policy. The year 1967 opened with the 
establishment of a National Sanitation Policy. In that same year 
the National Council for Environmental Pollution Control was 
created in the Health Ministry. All Brazilian states had at least 
one agency closely related to pollution abatement. General João 
Baptista Figueiredo, secretary-general of the National Security 
Council, and later president of Brazil, called attention in 1971 
to the need for a national policy of pollution control to be 
formulated by the federal government.38/ The Declaration of 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm in 1972, also called for the creation of a specialized 
agency. In short, the time was ripe for SEMA. Or as North 
American politicians are fond of saying, environmental management 
was "an idea whose time had come." Despite that, over a year had 
gone by since Stockholm and the government did not seem to be in 
any hurry. 
The opportunity came in the form of stench. Fortunately 
enough, the odors were causing pestilence in the home state of 
the chefe do gabinete civil, the chief of staff for the president 
of Brazil. The operation of a wood-pulp industry near Porto 
Alegre, the capital of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
was causing severe inconvenience for the general population. 
Every time the wind blew the wrong way, a new wave of nausea, 
vomiting, and sickness affected an increasingly vocal population. 
After contact was made with the Interior Ministry, which was 
supposed to have a say in urban planning and zoning, this matter 
was brought to the attention of the Gabinete Civil through a 
decree that was tailor-made for the situation. Its backers were 
ready with the necessary Exposição de Motivos [a document that 
usually accompanies a piece of legislation, containing the 
justification for a particular policy] and everything else that 
the patrimonial order would call for on such occasions. This 
decree provided for a specific agency to be charged with solving 
specific problems such as the one in question. Being a very 
popular figure in Rio Grande do Sul, where he had been president 
of one of the two major soccer teams, and being also an authority 
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on legal matters, Professor João Leit&o de Abreu, the chief of 
staff, immediately seized the opportunity. With the enactment of 
Decree 73.030 by President Garrastazú Mediei in October 1973, 
Brazil gained a new agency, the Secretaria Especial do Meio 
Ambiente, under the coordination of the interior minister (in 
1896 SEMA was transferred to the new Ministry of Urban 
Development). And the chief of staff got rid of a smelly problem. 
This experience reveals more about Brazil than it appears to 
do. The way in which an organisation comes, into being exerts 
strong influence on the perceived missions of its bureaucrats.39/ 
An agency that has resulted, for example, out of an emergency 
situation is likely to respond, in its day-to-day operations, in 
a spasmodic, emergency-like pattern. Another agency created to 
placate special interests is unlikely to address broader issues 
that may enlarge its clientele, thereby jeopardizing the original 
interests. Therefore, because we have analyzed the ecopolitical 
foundations of SEMA in the Brazilian social formation, it seemed 
appropriate to reveal the most intimate moments of SEMA*s birth. 
SEMA was created in response to an instance of environmental 
pollution, and this fact would later have a lasting effect bath 
on its members' sense of purpose, the organizational "culture" of 
SEMA, and on its effectiveness in implementing environmental 
policies as well. geopolitics in Third World countries deals more 
with managing the natural resource base than with abating 
pollution. Brazil was one of the leading speakers for this 
viewpoint at Stockholm.» Yet, up to now the dominant environmental 
perception in Brazil relates to the pollution of air, water, and 
soil rather than to natural resources management. 
A second element of SEMA's creation that also reflects the 
ruling alliance installed after . 1964 is the technocratic 
orientation instilled at the moment of its inception. First of 
all, the E.M. that accompanies the decree establishing SEMA 
justifies it on the grounds that Brazil already had a multitude 
of agencies working on specific areas, citing eighteen agencies 
distributed among nine ministries. Despite that, it was proposed 
as a "solution41 the creation of yet another organization. Worse, 
an agency that worked according to the dominant precepts of 
technobureaucratic behavior could not possibly be expected to get 
other agencies to cooperate. Being a second-class secretariat of 
a regular ministry, it could not have any political clout, even 
in the most strict bureaucratic sense, that would help formulate 
and implement a national environmental policy. Furthermore, the 
actual way in which SEMA was set up and staffed points to the 
predominance of a particular professional perspective, that of 
the natural sciences broadly defined: chemistry, biology, 
pharmacology, and others. As a result, the Brazilian government 
was able to depoliticize environmental issues, reducing them to a 
question of technical, or technobureaucratic, expertise. -
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Necessarily, these are some of the ecopolitical implications 
of the alliance forged after 1964. They all refer to structural 
characteristics of Brazilian society that cannot be done away by 
a regime change, not even by the "redemocratization" of the 
1980s. Therefore, observers must be temperate in their criticism 
of SEMA's role in managing the environment. To be sure, current 
practices reinforce the dominant ideology, and SEMA is liable for 
most of these. Nevertheless, the most important characteristics 
of ecopolitics in Brazil go beyond specific administrations; they 
have been unfolding through a much longer process. The advent of 
the military regime, it should be stated once more, simply 
enhanced already latent values, beliefs, and practices of the 
leadership cadres in Brazil. 
5. Development plans and the environment, a summary review 
Most countries of Latin America started to pay closer attention 
to planning activities immediately after, and in part because of, 
the 1929 crisis. In the case of Brazil, planning began to be 
taken seriously during the Getulio Vargas era.40/ The growth of 
State functions called for the existence of well-trained, 
professional bureaucrats. As part of the efforts to reform the 
administrative apparatus of the State, Vargas formed the 
Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) in 1938. 
One year later there appeared the Special Plan of Public Works 
and Equipment of National Defense, whose main objectives were to 
foster the creation of basic industries and to improve the 
infrastructure of transport. 
This is the period in which key planning institutions, such 
as the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), came into 
being. This was also the time when attention began to focus on 
the natural resources of the country, with the establishment of a 
multitude of public organizations to control, promote, or 
otherwise regulate the exploration for them. The National 
Department of Mineral Production (DNPM), the Vale do Rio Doce 
Company (CVRD), and the Brazilian Oil Company (PETROBRAS) are 
just few examples of dozens of state enterprises or agencies that 
appeared during the 1940s and 1950s. 
The military regime installed in 1964 was to inaugurate a 
period of profound changes, and the institutional aspects of 
national planning received more attention than ever. In 1967 the 
Extraordinary Ministry for Planning created by Goulart became the 
(permanent) Ministry of Planning and General Coordination—what 
today is the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the 
Republic. Since then those who have occupied this post have been 
traditionally the most powerful members of the cabinet, enjoying 
political clout equivalent to that of a prime minister in 
parliamentary regimes. The obligation to carry out planning 
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activities for social and economic development became enshrined 
at th^ highest institutional level, the Constitution of Brazil̂ ;,>. 
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It is not the case here to analyze the (environmental) 
results of the multitude of development plans. Nevertheless/ just 
as Brazil's environmental problems cannot be blamed on a lack of 
legislation, so they cannot be blamed on a lack of planning 
either. What seems to be missing is relevance, planning that is 
detailed and "appropriate." Considering that emphasis must be 
placed on the culture of bureaucracies as perceived by the actors 
involved, rather than one derived from some arbitrary order 
imposed by the observer, we should turn our attention to the 
perceptions of environmental officials. The overriding conclusion 
that comes out of various interviews at the highest levels of 
environmental decision-making is one of frustration with the job 
that SEMA has been able* to perform in this area. 
Insofar as the planning process is concerned, one 
generalized perception is that the culture of development 
planning in Brazil was, and still is, largely dominated by 
macroeconomia criteria. Development plans at the national as well 
as at the regional Levels consistently fail to incorporate any 
environmental dimension, much less one that might be deemed more 
or less appropriate. This is believed to be the case not only 
because of lack of understanding or sensitiveness to 
environmental issues on the part of economists who hold power 
positions in the planning structure; there also seems to be 
consensus that so long as development plans are prepared 
according to the concepts and techniques of economics, no one 
should expect better results. The dominant technobureaucratic 
ideology of "privatization" of national resources only compounds 
the difficulties. 
The institutional structure for planning is also held to be 
an obstacle to the incorporation of the environmental dimension 
into development plans. Located in one sectorial ministry, and 
having to compete for the allocation of resources on a sectorial 
basis, SEMA has repeatedly failed to influence the planning 
cultures of other ministries, and particularly that of the 
Planning Secretariat itself. Government officials often mentioned 
that every major public enterprise or project in Brazil already 
has an environmental unit. Yet, these units have played a minor, 
almost cosmetic role. Never have major revisions been promoted or 
projected because of their work. The environmental legislation 
requires that an impact assessment of large-scale projects be 
undertaken. The potential incentive for internal compliance is 
high, for the government is supposed to withhold the disbursement 
of resources until this requirement is met. Again, the law is 
uniformly ignored, and yet nobody has been punished so far. 
Finally, plans themselves are cited as indicators of the 
disappointing performance of SEMA. Most assessments regarding 
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SEMA's contribution to the several national and regional plans 
underline the fact that SEMA has never exerted any influence 
whatsoever. Some officials add that SEMA could not have done so, 
even if it had been "granted" the opportunity. SEMA lacks the 
necessary human and material resources to tackle the task of 
harmonizing sectorial programs and environmental criteria. 
In short, no matter how one looks at it, the conclusion 
seems to be the same. The ecological and environmental realities 
of Brazil have not made their way into planning yet. As the 
opening quotation to this paper indicates, Brazilian leaders have 
defined the situation as one where destiny "imposes" development, 
tearing down, moving on. The country is seen as big enough to 
heal itself, and this makes business as usual possible. 
Ironically, at Stockholm the Brazilian government passionately 
advocated that environment and development be tightly connected. 
But more than a decade after Stockholm, Brazilian government 
authorities have still decided not to realize in their own 
country what sermonized to the world. The situation described 
here assumes bleak overtones once additional elements are 
considered. The context of environmental problems, or the 
"agenda" of public policies in this area, adds to the complexity 
of policy formation and implementation. The multitude of actors 
involved in policy-making also renders environmental problems 
almost intractable in Brazil. 
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III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FORMATION 
At stake in ecopolicies is much more than the simplet arrangement 
of public actions in one area. It is the concept of development 
itself that is being called into question. Indeed/ ecopolicies 
that go beyond pollution control and abatement, important as 
these two dimensions certainly are, will often imply redefining, 
or at least redirecting, the process of development. On the other 
hand, because we cannot deal with all problems at once, we are 
forced to choose particular areas or problems for concentrated 
governmental efforts. However, by singling out any given area, we 
are bound to provoke jurisdictional disputes within and' between 
bureaucratic and societal institutions. This in addition, of 
course, to the problems derived from the application of what 
Simon calls "bounded rationality" [the limited capacity of the 
human mind compared to the scope of the problems it needs to 
address] to complex ecological relationships.41/ Finally, another 
important characteristic of public actions in this area derives 
from the impossibility of directly measuring their results for 
society as a whole. Likewise, ecopolicies are hardly amenable to 
the individualization of results. How can one measure the 
benefits of the conservation of natural resources for generations 
not yet born? What is one person's share of improved water 
quality, or an atmosphere free of pollutants? 
These three notions, that ecopolicies question development 
processes, that they generate jurisdictional disputes, and that 
they are nonquantifiable and nonindividualizable, all lead to one 
crucial feature of the context in which environmental problems 
emerge. Within the cultural framework of modern civilization, in 
which human beings are not part of but rather apart from nature, 
ecopolicies are clearly conflictive, unsympathetic, bothersome. 
Environmental policies stand out from other public policies by 
being "the spoiler." Traditional policies such as those carried 
out in agriculture, in education, in public health, or in social 
welfare, draw their legitimacy from "positive" objectives.They 
all "provide" something to society. Moreover, the implementation 
of these policies will, sooner or later, be transformed into 
tangible benefits to easily identifiable individuals or groups. 
Conversely, environmental policies address the collectivity as a 
whole, including unborn "collectivities." 
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Ecopolicies are characteristically "negative" in comparison 
with other policies, always calling attention to what should not 
be done, often emphasizing the negative side effects of the 
implementation of "positive" policies. On the other hand, some 
"negative" policies, such as fiscal and tributary policies, also 
"penalize" some groups while favoring others. But these policies 
claim their legitimacy from the coercive powers bestowed upon 
them by society. Nobody likes to pay taxes, but everyone agrees 
that governments need revenues to carry out programs. All expect 
to benefit from these programs. Fiscal policies are also seen as 
powerful mechanisms to foster an egalitarian distribution of 
resources, so most people abide by them. With environmental 
policies the opposite takes place. Even though the survival of 
the species could exert a strong coercive influence, the 
advocates of ecopolicies shy away from intimidation. Their 
legitimacy is usually founded on the need to harmonize disparate 
wants with the carrying capacity of life-support systems. 
We thus arrive at the core of the dilemma faced by 
policymakers formulating and struggling to implement 
environmental policies today. Their stand must be adversarial, 
almost by definition; yet decision makers are compelled to 
exercise persuasion, inducement, and convincement. Not 
surprisingly, it requires much more political will to break the 
inertia of ecopolicies than it does in other areas of public 
action. For the same reasons, it takes much less political clout 
on the other side to reach a situation of virtual stalemate, to 
immobilize environmentally oriented programs and activities. The 
crucial question, then, turns out to be whether this conflict is 
being well administered or not. 
We have seen sufficient indications that the intrinsic 
tensions of ecopolicies have not been well administered in 
Brazil. Quite the contrary, the way in which Brazil is governed 
only aggravates the conflicts, and it postpones their resolution 
as well. First of all, the negotiation that allows any conflict 
to be addressed presupposes the existence of actors that share 
more or less equivalent control over political resources. Nothing 
could be further from this assumption than politics in the 
environmental arena of Brazil, not to mention in the Third World 
in general. On one side there is a strong group of business 
people, developers, industrialists, multinational corporations, 
all of whom benefit greatly from accelerated economic growth. On 
the other side is a loosely related group of conservationists, 
community-based organizations, experts, and persons directly 
affected by pollution or by the depletion of natural resources. 
In the middle, in some sense over both groups, stands the 
bureaucracy. 
As Francis Rourke rightfully points out, bureaucrats are 
unable to rule alone, but their strategic role in policy-making 
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means that "no one in modern politics can rule without them" 
either.42/ if this is true in the North American context, J%í<ps-
even more so in Brazil, where the technobureaucracy has bee^-we 
leading force behind developmental ism in the postwar period'. The 
"actors" involved in Brazilian ecopolitics have thus had uttotpil 
power, which renders the situation a "nonconflictive" one. State 
agents set the stage for mediation, but they themselves 
unilaterally set the limits of such negotiation. These limits can 
be summarized as follows. National leaders do not acknowledge 
that the security of the nation depends upon an ecologically 
sound development strategy; instead, environmental criteria are 
subsumed by security interests that are defined militarily. 
Furthermore, rapid economic growth have high priority over 
conservation. On top of that, the corporate elite and the 
technobureaucracy share an ideological orientation toward the 
private allocation of natural resources regarding the Brazilian 
"commons." As can be readily inferred, this is clearly a no-win 
type of war. 
The situation is not, of course, as bad as it looks. 
Actually, it is much worse 1 one may argue, not without reason, 
that in a situation such as Brazil—a statist society embedded in 
a patrimonial order—most of the conflicts, as well as any 
possible negotiations, occur within the governing elite father 
than through independent political actors. The sheer number of 
actors inside each segment of the governmental bureaucracy 
effectively precludes attempts at interorganizatiortal 
cooperation. 4 3/ The Secretariat for Modernization end 
Administrative Reform (SEMOR), an agency until mid-1986 
subordinated to the planning minister (and since* transferred to 
the Ministry of Administration), once set out to determine how 
many organizations at only the federal level were involved in 
environmental matters.44/ For pollution control, for example, it 
found sixteen agencies distributed among six ministries. However, 
the method used to arrive at such estimates was too restrictive. 
As a former deputy-secretary of SEMOR myself, I know that this 
number does not even approximate the real picture. A simple/more 
recent example underscores this/when a group of techniciens 
decided to find out how many agencies dealt with something as 
simple as fishing activities. When they gave up counting, over 
sixty federal agencies had already been identified. This means 
that for any given problem or issue, SEMA would have to negotiate 
with at least several agencies in every one of the twenty-five or 
so ministries.45/ 
Unfortunately, given the characteristics of both the context 
of environmental problems and the actors involved in the 
formation of ecopolicy in Brazil, some of the widely accepted 
"principles" of bureaucratic behavior inhibit still further the 
emergence of coherent policies in this area. The first and most 
important of these postulates refers to the fact that "where you 
stand depends on where you sit," which is also called Miles' 
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Law.4J>/ It means that the position of a bureaucrat on any policy 
issue is determined by the culture of the agency that he or she 
represents. This culture, in turn, reflects the institutional 
history of the agency, as well as the ideology, values, symbols, 
professional leanings, and crystallized patterns of behavior of 
the group of bureaucrats who make up the organization. 
Examples of Miles' Law in Brazil are easily found. Typical 
of the failure to consider the logic of bureaucratic behavior are 
housing policies in which the most important policy mechanism is 
a financial institution. Fully to appreciate the degree to which 
these policies are bound to fail, one must remember why they come 
into being in the first place. If market mechanisms alone were 
able to satisfy the demands of a population who cannot afford to 
buy homes, there would not have been a need for a specific policy 
in this area. This should mean that, once the intervention of the 
State becomes inevitable, a different sort of rationality would 
prevail, one in which the "social" objectives would have primacy 
over the "financial." What happens, then, when the National 
Housing Bank is chosen as the primary instrument to implement 
such policy? The answer is straightforward: a nonhousing policy. 
The assumption is that a bank is run by bankers, and a 
banker who is not able to invest a bank's resources so as to earn 
an acceptable rate of return is simply not a good banker. Such a 
person would be considered an incompetent, a bad professional, 
even though his or her actions may be informed by the highest 
social values. The result is that little by little the initial 
objectives of the policy begin to fade away. New resources begin 
to be oriented toward middle-income and upper-income individuals 
who can guarantee the overall financial soundness of the system. 
When society starts to demand a return to the original goals, the 
system faces the prospects of going "bankrupt." This is precisely 
what happened in Brazil, but the example can be generalized. Some 
would argue that the above description simplifies the problem too 
much, and that several variables contribute to repeated failure 
in those areas. They are right. Nevertheless, what must be 
stressed here is that aspects such as the ones just mentioned are 
equally crucial to explain the failure of policies that require a 
bureaucratic organization for their implementation. 
This brief vignette of bureaucracy at work is useful because 
it shows how "bureaucratic politics," at the most elemental 
level, manifests its logic. Nothing here is exclusive to 
Brazilian society. There are several studies in the United States 
showing how bureaucrats shape policy to a greater extent than 
politicians and top executive officials accept to be the case.47/ 
Add a large amount of arbitrary, preposterous, and authoritarian 
behavior entailed by a patrimonial order and an oversized, 
overgrown State, and the picture becomes more complete. An agency 
such as SEMA, located first in a ministry whose culture values 
public-works as the primary outcome of its policies, thus finds 
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It very hard to assume, or to convince others to assume, a 
posture of harmonizing the environment and development. 
The foregoing remarks about the actors involved in 
ecopolicy- making, the context in which their "acting" takes 
place, and the laws governing their performance, allow us to 
introduce two additional components of bureaucratic politics that 
are of paramount importance for environmental policies. The first 
is that the more controversial a policy is, the more likely it is 
that it will never be fully formulated, and, if it is, it will 
never be implemented. If this were not self-explanatory, one 
would need only to examine the reasons that agrarian reforms are 
the oldest rhetorical policies in Latin America. It also explains 
why sweeping agrarian reform is never implemented. For the same 
reasons, decisions involving antagonistic interests that can be 
postponed will be postponed indefinitely.48/ 
Unfortunately, environmental policies are by definition 
controversial, and they necessarily involve disparate, often 
opposing social and economic interests. Brazilian policymakers 
are well aware of this fact. They knew this long before SEMA came 
into being, and it would take much more than a single agency to 
change this state of affairs. As a matter of fact, in light of 
the Brazilian case, a corollary to the two laws mentioned above 
could be suggested: the principle of the bottom line. Because the 
interests involved in ecopolicies are often conflictive, and 
because these policies are controversial anyway, one should 
strive "to compromise," to arrive at a minimum Common 
denominator. The problem is that minimum in this case means "the 
less powerful." Consequently, the bottom line of ecopoliciesin 
Brazil has been the familiar "development with low ecological 
cost," an euphemism created by the military regime to conceal the 
true meaning of the developmental1st ideology, 1. e., development 
at any cost, social or environmental. 
Brazilian elites, particularly technocrats, have also 
learned the lessons of coping with innovations. Environmental 
problems are fairly recent or, better said, their recognition is 
indeed of a recent date. Ecopolicies thus represent an 
innovation, almost a revolutionary innovation, to the process of 
development planning. Faced with this new challenge, the 
Brazilian bureaucracy has adopted what Donald Schon calls 
"dynamic conservatism."49/ First, one accepts a discourse that 
incorporates the new issue, something that was successfully 
demonstrated at Stockholm. Then follows the stage of "containment 
and isolation," when one literally throws the discourse into a 
bureaucratic box in the governmental structure. Care should be 
taken, of course, not to provide adequate resources to this new 
agency. Just enough persons should be employed to give the 
impression that something major is being done—and to serve as 
scapegoats when things do not (as one knows that they will not) 
get done. Just enough resources should be allocated for a couple 
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of works to be built and, it should not be forgotten, for 
studies, dozens of studies. 
Containment and isolation also have another important, 
beneficial side effect for dynamic conservatism. These processes 
lead to compartmentalization. Now that SEMA is in place, busily 
tilting against its windmills, there comes the phase of 
"selective inattention." In other words, SEMA must be in a bus 
stop where the bus of power does not stop. Does the law require 
that SEMA participate in activities related to science and 
technology? Well, we may include a SEMA representative on an 
interagency committee, because, after all, we do not expect 
results to come out of committee work anyway.50/ The law requires 
that large-scale infrastructure projects should undertake a 
thorough evaluation of their impact on the availability of 
natural resources and on the integrity of environment in its area 
of influence? So we create an environmental unit as part of these 
projects and pretend not to perceive that we do not allow it to 
interfere with planning or with implementation of the projects. 
Finally, we may include a section on the environment in 
development plans, but we also forget to consider the targets and 
strategies outlined in this one section in the other, substantial 
parts of these plans. 
In short, one should promote the minimum change possible so 
as to guarantee that nothing will actually change. This is 
dynamic conservatism. It is dynamic because it is not the result 
of a carefully conceived scheme of overt resistance. There is no 
conspiracy theory at work here. This brand of bureaucratic 
conservatism develops out of the synergistic effect of 
particularistic interests. The individual, group, or class is 
able to establish a connection between these interests and the 
(inertial) interests of the social system as a whole. Because 
everyone is bound to be affected by ecopolicies, there is no need 
to connive in accord against taking them seriously. It is just a 
question of letting the bureaucratic process run its course. 
We have seen this movie before, at different times, with 
different characters, and in different national settings. But 
there can be no doubt that the script is tailor-made for the 
patrimonial order. And the Brazilian bureaucracy has had plenty 
of candidates for the roles of starring actor, supporting actors 
and, as a matter of fact, for the entire cast. The only thing we 
will not find in this movie is the traditional disclaimer. If any 
character, event or situation resembles SEMA and environmental 
policies in Brazil, it is not merely a coincidence. 
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